

Fully Homomorphic Encryption for Matrix Arithmetic

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Abstract

We propose an efficient fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme tailored for matrix arithmetic based on the Ring-Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem. **The proposed scheme naturally supports matrix multiplication, addition, and Hadamard multiplication for batched matrices of various sizes over both complex numbers and integers.** Encrypted matrix multiplication is reduced to four matrix multiplications of ciphertext elements, without the need for expensive operations such as slot-to-coefficient conversion or ring switching. In addition, the scheme efficiently supports matrix transformations, including general and conjugate transpositions, as well as matrix rotations: inter-matrix rotations across batched matrices and intra-matrix rotations within rows and columns. Moreover, the proposed FHE scheme can be directly combined with existing bootstrapping algorithms.

By eliminating the need for expensive operations such as repeated slot rotations and conversion between slot- and coefficient-encoding, the proposed construction achieves significant performance improvements. In our construction, encrypted multiplications of $n \times n$ matrices under slot encoding are decomposed into two parts: (1) matrix multiplication — four $n \times n$ matrix multiplications of ciphertext coefficients, and (2) key switching — with a total cost approximately 2–4 times that of Hadamard multiplication. We implemented the proposed scheme and utilized the FLINT library for the matrix multiplication component. Experimental results demonstrate that, even when leveraging highly optimized implementations, matrix multiplication remains the major cost, indicating that our construction substantially reduces auxiliary overheads and achieves strong overall efficiency.

Keywords: Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) , matrix multiplication , ring-learning with errors (RLWE).

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1 Introduction

Homomorphic encryption (HE) enables computation on encrypted data and is a key tool for privacy-enhancing technologies. Since Gentry’s blueprint for fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gen09a, Gen09b], many different schemes have been proposed. Ducas and Micciancio (DM) scheme and its variants [DM15, CGGI17, LMK⁺23] support arbitrary look-up table operations. Although they achieve low latency with small key sizes, their throughput remains limited because each ciphertext can handle only a single bit or a small integer. For high throughput, a single instruction multiple data (SIMD) operation is essential, and slot encoding is the core technique for SIMD operation in FHE. The Brakerski-Gentry-Vaikuntanathan (BGV) [BGV12], Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren (BFV) [Bra12a, FV12], and Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) [CKKS17] schemes are the most widely deployed FHE schemes with SIMD operation, based on the hardness of the Ring-Learning with Errors (RLWE) problem. The BGV and BFV schemes support exact arithmetic over finite fields, while the CKKS scheme supports approximate arithmetic over complex numbers.

Matrix multiplication is one of the most fundamental operations in many applications, including machine learning. In particular, ciphertext-ciphertext (ct-ct) matrix multiplication has recently become highly relevant in privacy-preserving large language models (LLMs), as the transformer structure inherently requires ct-ct matrix multiplication in its attention mechanism even when the weight matrix is given in plaintext [MYJK24]. However, the message slot of HE schemes is usually treated as a vector, and there is no natural way to handle matrices. Instead, there have been many attempts to optimize matrix multiplication by using existing operations such as rotation and Hadamard multiplication [HS18, JKLS18, AR24, CYW⁺25, MYJK24]. Therefore, although homomorphic addition and multiplication incur some overhead compared to their plaintext counterparts, the overhead of matrix multiplication under HE is far more significant.

Liu et al. and Bae et al. showed that we can reduce plaintext-ciphertext (pt-ct) matrix multiplication for large matrices to matrix multiplication in ciphertext components and input plaintexts [LZ23, BCH⁺24]. Recently, Park extended it to ct-ct matrix multiplication [Par25], which reduces ct-ct matrix multiplication. These techniques leverage well-optimized matrix multiplication libraries such as BLAS, providing a significant speedup. However, this method is limited to cases where the matrix size equals the ring dimension, which is typically too large for practical use. Moreover, since the matrix is encoded in coefficients rather than slots, each matrix multiplication combined with SIMD operations requires expensive slot-to-coefficient and coefficient-to-slot conversions.

Although matrix multiplication is a fundamental operation in many applications, an efficient FHE scheme supporting matrix multiplication directly on slot-encoded data remains an open problem. We propose an FHE scheme that supports efficient encrypted matrix multiplication, addition, Hadamard multiplication, and matrix transposition. The matrix multiplication is as efficient as Park’s scheme for large matrices, but our scheme performs matrix operations directly on slot-encoded ciphertexts, thereby eliminating the need for costly conversions between slots and coefficients. Moreover, in our scheme, the matrix size is adjustable, making it considerably more efficient for smaller matrices. The key-switching cost for our matrix multiplication is typically only two to three times that of Hadamard multiplication, and at most four times. In our experiments with 16 complex matrices of size 256×256 , the key switching for Hadamard multiplication and matrix multiplication took 1.17s and 3.32s, respectively. Since the key switching of Hadamard multiplication itself achieves a comparable amortized cost to existing RLWE-based HE schemes (1.11 μ s and 0.82 μ s, respectively, in our implementation and OpenFHE [BAB⁺22]), this demonstrates the efficiency of our matrix multiplication as well.

1.1 Related Works

Matrix Multiplication in FHE The foundational work by Halevi and Shoup proposed a baby-step giant-step algorithm to compute pt-ct matrix multiplication with $O(\sqrt{n})$ rotations [HS18]. Jiang et al. proposed an efficient algorithm for ct-ct multiplication using a novel encoding structure [JKLS18], which has been adopted in many current implementations. Aikata and Roy improved the runtime by introducing a well-organized packing structure and reducing the number of key-switching operations [AR24]. Bicyclic encoding was proposed in [CYW⁺25] for ct-ct matrix multiplication between coprime-dimensional matrices. However, this algorithm is restricted to specific matrix shapes. For efficient matrix multiplication in both ct-ct and pt-ct cases, [MYJK24] proposed a lower- and upper-diagonal encoding that significantly reduces the computational overhead for transformer models. However, all these approaches rely on classical slot encoding for vectors and rotations, so the performance remains limited.

Another line of work aims to reduce homomorphic matrix multiplication to several plaintext matrix multiplications. The reduction for pt-ct matrix multiplication was first considered in two pioneering works [LZ23, BCH⁺24]. Recently, Park proposed a method for efficient ct-ct matrix multiplication by reducing it to several plaintext matrix multiplications [Par25].

Comparison with Park’s Method Park’s work [Par25] is the most relevant to ours, which also reduces ct-ct matrix multiplication to several plaintext matrix multiplications. Our homomorphic matrix multiplication and key switching are similar to that method. However, the existing approach suffers from two main drawbacks: first, the size of the matrix must be equal to the ring dimension, and second, the matrix is encoded in the coefficients.

A typical choice of ring dimension for CKKS, BGV, and BFV ranges from 2^{12} up to 2^{17} , which is too large for practical use of matrix multiplication. To overcome this drawback, one has to use the ring-switching technique when the ring size is much larger than the matrices due to parameter choices; for example, we need the ring dimension 2^{16} for bootstrapping. Even with ring switching, since the minimum ring dimension to support a single multiplication is 2^{12} , the minimum matrix size remains large in certain scenarios. In addition, matrix multiplication can only be performed on a ciphertext with a low level, which may limit circuit design and necessitate bootstrapping for each matrix multiplication.

To utilize Park’s method with SIMD operations, one must repeatedly switch between coefficient and slot encodings using homomorphic linear transformations, which are known to be the main bottleneck even in bootstrapping performance. Another limitation of coefficient encoding, often overlooked in the literature, is that coefficient-to-slot and slot-to-coefficient operations change the order of data. For efficiency, we mix a variant of decimation-in-frequency (DIT) FFT and decimation-in-time (DIF) FFT for these transformations, and the outputs of these algorithms therefore appear in a bit-reverse-like order. One may re-align slots with masking and rotations, yet this inevitably incurs multiple key-switching operations and additional level consumption.

1.2 Technical Overview and Our Contribution

We propose a novel FHE scheme for efficient matrix arithmetic, supporting ciphertext(plaintext)-ciphertext matrix multiplication, addition, Hadamard multiplication, matrix transposition, and matrix rotations. There are two main ingredients in the proposed scheme: a multivariate ring and a Gaussian-integer point of view. The adoption of a multivariate ring allows us to handle matrices of arbitrary size, and to embed more matrices for large parameters. The Gaussian-integer point of view allows us to define a natural and efficient encoding of integer and complex matrices into RLWE ciphertexts, which enables efficient encrypted matrix multiplication and transpositions.

We use a ring $R'_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[i][X, Y, W] / \langle X^n - i, Y^n - i, \Phi_p(W) \rangle$ for encoding and encryption, where n is a power of two and p is an odd number. This is represented as n elements in the smaller ring $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[i][X, W] / \langle X^n - i, \Phi_p(W) \rangle$, and the natural isomorphism $R_q \cong \mathbb{Z}_q[X] / \langle \Phi_{4np}(X) \rangle$ guarantees security equivalent to standard RLWE-based schemes [LPR10, LPR13].

For ζ_j and η_ℓ , primitive $4n$ -th and p -th roots of unity in $\mathbb{C}$ (or $\mathbb{Z}_t$), respectively. Especially, $\zeta_j^n = i$ for all $j = 0, \dots, n-1$. A polynomial $m \in R'_q$ encodes $\varphi(p)$ $n \times n$ matrices, where φ denotes the Euler totient function, such that

$$m(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) = M_{jk}^{(\ell)}, \quad j, k \in [0, n), \ell \in [0, \varphi(p)),$$

where $M_{jk}^{(\ell)}$ denotes the (j, k) -th entry of the ℓ -th matrix $M^{(\ell)}$. We introduce an auxiliary variable Z and define the trace operation over Z as the degree-zero component in Z . Then, the matrix multiplication of two matrices encoded in polynomials m_0, m_1 is represented by

$$\text{Tr}_Z(\overline{m_0}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1}) \cdot m_1(X, Z, W)), \quad (1)$$

where $\overline{m_0}$ is the complex conjugate of m_0 . As the secret key is defined in R_q , it does not involve the Z -component, and thus the secret key commutes with the trace operation; in other words, we can perform the *homomorphic trace*. We also show that Eq. (1) can be efficiently computed by matrix multiplication of the coefficients of m_0 and m_1 ; the matrix multiplication of $n \times n$ matrices over $\mathbb{C}$ (or over $\mathbb{Z}_t$) is reduced to four $n \times n$ matrix multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_q[i]$.

Since a polynomial encodes matrix elements in each evaluation point of its roots of unity, we can naturally define matrix addition and Hadamard multiplication. Moreover, the ring automorphisms naturally give row, column, and inter-matrix rotations. The permutation $(X, Y) \mapsto (Y, X)$ corresponds to the transposition. While the proposed ciphertext corresponds to n independent ciphertexts in R_q , we can directly apply the existing bootstrapping algorithms for RLWE-based FHE schemes.

The new viewpoint of the widely used ring $\mathbb{Z}[X] / \langle X^N + 1 \rangle$ as the Gaussian-integer polynomial $\mathbb{Z}[i][X] / \langle X^{N/2} - i \rangle$ enables the extension along the Y axis to $\mathbb{Z}[i][X, Y] / \langle X^{N/2} - i, Y^{N/2} - i \rangle$ with $N/2$ distinct ciphertexts. This allows us to define a natural encoding of matrices using only half of the roots of unity of the form ζ^{5^j} , where $\zeta = e^{2\pi i/2N}$. Without such a Gaussian-integer viewpoint, the extended ring, for example $\mathbb{Z}[X, Y] / \langle X^N + 1, Y^N + 1 \rangle$, does not readily provide an efficient matrix encoding. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to exploit the Gaussian-integer structure for matrix encoding in FHE schemes.

1.3 Organization

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review RLWE-based FHE schemes. In Section 3, we present our FHE scheme for complex matrix arithmetic by introducing a CKKS-like encoding for matrices. Section 4 extends the proposed scheme to integer matrix arithmetic using a BGV-like encoding. Implementation results are presented in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper with remarks in Section 6.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Basic Notation

The ring of Gaussian integers is defined as $\mathbb{Z}[i] = \{a + bi \mid a, b \in \mathbb{Z}\}$, which is canonically isomorphic to the quotient ring $\mathbb{Z}[i] \cong \mathbb{Z}[I] / \langle I^2 + 1 \rangle$. Let n be a power of two and p an odd number, where, for simplicity of presentation, we assume that $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ is a cyclic group generated by γ . We define the polynomial ring

$$R = \mathbb{Z}[i][X, W] / \langle X^n - i, \Phi_p(W) \rangle \cong \mathbb{Z}[I, X, W] / \langle I^2 + 1, X^n - I, \Phi_p(W) \rangle,$$

where Φ_m denotes the m -th cyclotomic polynomial. For a modulus $q \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$, we denote $R_q = R/qR$. Similarly, we define the three-variable polynomial ring

$$R' = \mathbb{Z}[i][X, Y, W] / \langle X^n - i, Y^n - i, \Phi_p(W) \rangle.$$

For a ring R and a positive integer n , we define the matrix space $\mathcal{M}_n(R) := \{(a_{jk}) \mid a_{jk} \in R, 1 \leq j, k \leq n\}$, the set of all $n \times n$ matrices over R . Vectors are denoted in bold lowercase, e.g., $\mathbf{a}$, while matrices are denoted in uppercase, e.g., M . The conjugate transpose of a matrix $M \in \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})$ or $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_q[i])$ is denoted by M^* . The (j, k) -th entry of a matrix M is denoted by M_{jk} or $[M]_{jk}$. Polynomials are denoted in lowercase, e.g., $a(X, W) \in R$; when it is clear from the context, we may simply write a .

2.2 (Ring)-LWE Encryption

In the RLWE encryption scheme, we use a ring $\mathbb{Z}[X] / \langle \Phi_M(X) \rangle$ [LPR13]. A typical choice is to take M as a power of two, i.e., $\Phi_M(X) = X^{M/2} + 1$, due to its efficiency in polynomial arithmetic using the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). Note that the ring R is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}[X, W] / \langle \Phi_{4n}(X), \Phi_p(W) \rangle \cong \mathbb{Z}[X] / \langle \Phi_{4np}(X) \rangle$, as $\mathbb{Z}[i][X] / \langle X^n - i \rangle \cong \mathbb{Z}[X] / \langle X^{2n} + 1 \rangle$ and $\gcd(4n, p) = 1$.

For a given secret key polynomial $s \leftarrow \chi_{\text{key}}$, a ciphertext of a message polynomial m , $\text{ct}_s(m) = (b, a) \in R_q^2$, satisfies the following equation:

$$b = -a \cdot s + m + e,$$

where $a \leftarrow R_q$ is uniformly random, and $e \leftarrow \chi_{\text{err}}$ is an error polynomial sampled from an error distribution χ_{err} (e.g., a discrete Gaussian distribution). The decryption of ciphertext $\text{ct}(m) = (b, a)$ is performed as follows:

$$m \approx b + a \cdot s \bmod q.$$

In the BGV scheme, the encryption can be written as [BGV12]:

$$b = -a \cdot s + m + t \cdot e,$$

for the message modulus t satisfying $\gcd(t, q) = 1$. The decryption is then performed as

$$m = \left[b + a \cdot s \right]_t,$$

if $\|t \cdot e\|_\infty < q/2$, with $[x]_t$ denoting $x \pmod{t}$.

2.3 RLWE-based FHE and Key Switching

We provide a brief review of the RLWE-based FHE schemes in this section. For ease of explanation, we focus on the CKKS scheme here, and then extend to the BGV scheme [BGV12] in a later section. Readers are also referred to the BFV scheme [Bra12b, FV12] for more details.

Encoding and Encryption The CKKS scheme [CKKS17] is an FHE scheme for approximate arithmetic over complex numbers. The plaintext space of the CKKS scheme is usually defined by a ring $\mathbb{Z}[X] / \langle X^N + 1 \rangle$ with a power-of-two N . We embed $N/2$ complex numbers into a plaintext polynomial $m \in R$ using the canonical embedding. Let ζ_j for $j = 0, \dots, N-1$ be the primitive $2N$ -th roots of unity in $\mathbb{C}$. In other words, ζ_j is an odd power of $\zeta = e^{2\pi i/2N}$, namely

$$\zeta_j = \zeta^{5^j} \text{ if } 0 \leq j < N/2, \quad \zeta^{-5^{j-N/2}} \text{ if } N/2 \leq j < N.$$

thus $\zeta_{j+N/2} = \overline{\zeta_j}$.

The canonical embedding $\pi : R \rightarrow \mathbb{C}^{N/2}$ is defined as

$$\pi(a) = (a(\zeta_0), a(\zeta_1), \dots, a(\zeta_{N-1})).$$

The encoding of a vector of complex numbers $\mathbf{z} = (z_0, z_1, \dots, z_{N/2-1}) \in \mathbb{C}^{N/2}$ is defined as

$$m(X) = \text{encode}(\mathbf{z}) = \lfloor \pi^{-1}(z_0, z_1, \dots, z_{N/2-1}, \overline{z_0}, \overline{z_1}, \dots, \overline{z_{N/2-1}}) \cdot \Delta \rfloor,$$

where Δ is a scaling factor to control the precision of encoding. Note that the conjugate symmetry ensures that the encoded polynomial has real coefficients. Decoding is simply the inverse of encoding.

We encrypt the encoded plaintext polynomial m using the RLWE encryption described above. The ciphertext $\text{ct}_s(m) = (b = m + e - a \cdot s, a) \in R_q^2$ is an encryption of m under a secret key s , satisfying $b + a \cdot s = m + e \approx m$, for sufficiently large Δ .

Addition and Multiplication The addition of two ciphertexts $\text{ct}_s(m_1) = (b_1, a_1)$ and $\text{ct}_s(m_2) = (b_2, a_2)$ is given by the component-wise addition $(b_1 + b_2, a_1 + a_2)$, which is an encryption of $m_1 + m_2$ under the same secret key s :

$$(b_1 + b_2) + (a_1 + a_2) \cdot s = m_1 + m_2 + (e_1 + e_2) \approx m_1 + m_2.$$

The multiplication of two ciphertexts is a three-element ciphertext $(d_0, d_1, d_2) = (b_1 \cdot b_2, b_1 \cdot a_2 + a_1 \cdot b_2, a_1 \cdot a_2)$, which is an encryption of $m_1 m_2$. We can decrypt the ciphertext as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \langle (d_0, d_1, d_2), (1, s, s^2) \rangle &= b_1 b_2 + (b_1 a_2 + a_1 b_2) \cdot s + (a_1 a_2) \cdot s^2 \\ &= m_1 m_2 + m_1 e_2 + m_2 e_1 + e_1 e_2 \approx m_1 m_2. \end{aligned}$$

However, the secret key of the multiplied ciphertext is now $(1, s, s^2)$, and we switch it back to $(1, s)$ for further operations. Likewise, some homomorphic operations result in a ciphertext with a different key from the original one, and it is required to switch the secret key back. The process is called the *key switching*, or specifically, for multiplication, we call it *relinearization*.

Key Switching Let $s, s' \in R_2$ be distinct secret keys. The key-switching technique is to convert a ciphertext encrypted under s' to a ciphertext encrypted under s . For a ciphertext $\text{ct}_{s'} = (b, a)$ for secret key s' , i.e., $m = b + a \cdot s'$ (noise is ignored for simple notation.) The core idea of key switching from s' to s is to obtain the encryption of $a \cdot s'$ under the new secret key s , with small noise. Then we have the encryption of m under s as follows:

$$(b, 0) + \text{ct}_s(a \cdot s') = \text{ct}_s(b) + \text{ct}_s(a \cdot s) = \text{ct}_s(b + a \cdot s) = \text{ct}_s(m).$$

Similarly, given a multiplied ciphertext (d_0, d_1, d_2) , we can switch the secret key back to s using $\text{ct}_s(d_2 \cdot s^2)$ as follows:

$$(d_0, d_1) + \text{ct}_s(d_2 \cdot s^2) = \text{ct}_s(d_0 + d_1 \cdot s) + \text{ct}_s(d_2 \cdot s^2) = \text{ct}_s(m_1 m_2).$$

The main challenge in key switching lies in computing $\text{ct}_s(a \cdot s')$ with small noise, where a is a uniformly random polynomial as in the RLWE problem. We use the *decomposition* technique and RLWE' ciphertexts for the key-switching process [GSW13]. Assume there exists a decomposition vector $\vec{g} = (g_0, g_1, \dots, g_{d_g-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{d_g}$ and a decomposition function $h : \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}^{d_g}$ satisfying the following:

1. For $a \in R$, $h(a) = (a_0, a_1, \dots, a_{d_g-1})$, and $\|a_i\| < B$ for some bound B .
2. $\langle h(a), \vec{g} \rangle = a$, or at least $\langle h(a), \vec{g} \rangle \approx a$ with negligible noise.

Note that it is naturally extended to R and R' . Various kinds of decomposition exist in the literature; see, e.g., [GSW13, BGV12, FV12, DM15, CGGI17, HK20, LMK⁺23].

Then, we define the RLWE' ciphertexts as a set of ciphertexts:

$$\text{RLWE}'_s(m) = (\text{ct}(g_0m), \text{ct}(g_1m), \dots, \text{ct}(g_{d_g-1}m)).$$

This allows us to define the outer product $\odot : R \times \text{RLWE}' \rightarrow \text{RLWE}$:

$$\begin{aligned} a \odot \text{RLWE}'(m) &= \langle h(a), \text{RLWE}'(m) \rangle = \sum_i (a_i \cdot \text{ct}(g_i m)) \\ &= \text{ct}\left(\sum_i a_i g_i m\right) = \text{ct}(am). \end{aligned}$$

Although the noise introduced by the outer product is on the order of $d_g B \ll q$, it is still much larger than that of a fresh ciphertext. Therefore, we temporarily increase the modulus to qq_o for some integer q_o , and scale down the ciphertext after the outer product, a technique known as modulus switching [GHS12b, CKKS17].

We define the key-switching key $\text{ksk}_{s' \mapsto s} = \text{RLWE}'_s(q_o s') \in R_{qq_o}^{2d_g}$, for an integer q_o satisfying $q_o > B$. Then, we have $a \odot \text{ksk}_{s' \mapsto s} = (b', a') = \text{ct}_s(as'q_o)$. By performing the modulus switching operation, as follows, we can reduce the noise approximately by $1/q_o$ and then achieve $\text{ct}_s(as')$:

$$\left\lfloor \frac{1}{q_o} \text{ct}_s(as'q_o) \right\rfloor = \left(\left\lfloor \frac{b'}{q_o} \right\rfloor, \left\lfloor \frac{a'}{q_o} \right\rfloor \right) = \text{ct}_s(as') \bmod q.$$

We define the process $\text{Switch}(a, \text{ksk}_{s' \mapsto s})$ to output $\text{ct}_s(as') \in R_q^2$. Finally, we can achieve the ciphertext of the message under the secret key s from a ciphertext $\text{ct}_{s'}(m) = (b, a)$ as follows:

$$(b, 0) + \text{Switch}(a, \text{ksk}_{s' \mapsto s}). \quad (2)$$

Rotation and Conjugation Noting that $\zeta_j = \zeta^{5^j}$, for a polynomial $m(X) \in R$, the rotation of the plaintext slots by δ positions is equivalent to $m(X^{5^\delta})$, i.e.,

$$\pi(m(X^{5^\delta})) = (m(\zeta_\delta), m(\zeta_{\delta+1}), \dots, m(\zeta_{\delta-1}), m(\overline{\zeta_\delta}), m(\overline{\zeta_{\delta+1}}), \dots, m(\overline{\zeta_{\delta-1}})).$$

Likewise, the conjugation of the plaintext slots is equivalent to $m(X^{-1})$. To perform the rotation and conjugation homomorphically, we use the following ring automorphism [CHK⁺18, GHS12a]. For an odd number α , we have the automorphism $\tau_\alpha : R \rightarrow R$ defined as $\tau_\alpha(m(X)) = m(X^\alpha)$, thus

$$m(X^\alpha) = b(X^\alpha) + a(X^\alpha) \cdot s(X^\alpha),$$

where $\text{ct}(m) = (b(X), a(X))$ is an encryption of $m(X)$ under the secret key $s(X)$. Finally, the key-switching technique is used to switch the secret key from $s(X^\alpha)$ back to $s(X)$:

$$(b(X^\alpha), 0) + \text{Switch}(a(X^\alpha), \text{ksk}_{s(X^\alpha) \mapsto s(X)}).$$

Rescaling We use the rescaling of the CKKS scheme [CKKS17] to reduce the scale of a ciphertext, which is usually required after a multiplication operation. Let $\text{ct}(m\Delta) = (b, a)$ be a ciphertext encrypting a plaintext m with scaling factor Δ , i.e., $b + a \cdot s = m\Delta + e \approx m\Delta$. The rescaling operation is defined as follows:

$$\text{rescale}(\text{ct}(m\Delta)) = \left(\left\lfloor \frac{b}{r} \right\rfloor, \left\lfloor \frac{a}{r} \right\rfloor \right) \in R_{q/r}^2,$$

for some integer r dividing q . Then, we have

$$\left\lfloor \frac{b}{r} \right\rfloor + \left\lfloor \frac{a}{r} \right\rfloor \cdot s \approx \left\lfloor \frac{m\Delta + e}{r} \right\rfloor \approx \frac{m\Delta}{r},$$

which is an encryption of m with scaling factor Δ/r .

3 Proposed Scheme

In this section, we propose an efficient FHE scheme for matrices over $\mathbb{C}$. We introduce a new encoding method that batches multiple matrices into a polynomial, which transforms encoded matrix multiplication into the trace of a polynomial product. We extend the proposed method to $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_t)$ in a subsequent section.

3.1 Encoding of Matrices

Encoding of Complex Matrices For encoding of complex matrices, we first define a map σ from $\mathbb{C}[X, Y, W]/\langle X^n - i, Y^n - i, \Phi_p(W) \rangle$ to $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})^{\varphi(p)}$:

$$\sigma(m) = \left\{ M_{jk}^{(\ell)} = m(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) : j, k \in [0, n), \ell \in [0, \varphi(p)) \right\},$$

where ζ_j are $4n$ -th primitive roots of unity in $\mathbb{C}$ satisfying $\zeta_j^n = i$ (i.e., ζ^{5^j} , ignoring the other half), and η_ℓ are p -th primitive roots of unity. We use σ for decoding and σ^{-1} for encoding. To preserve precision, we adopt the scaling technique from CKKS [CKKS17]. Hence, the encoding of a set of matrices $T = \{M^{(\ell)}\}_{\ell \in [0, \varphi(p))} \in \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})^{\varphi(p)}$, where $M_{jk}^{(\ell)}$ is the (j, k) -th entry of $M^{(\ell)}$, is defined as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Encode} : \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})^{\varphi(p)} &\rightarrow R' \\ T &\mapsto \lfloor \sigma^{-1}(T) \cdot \Delta \rfloor, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where Δ is the scaling factor and $\lfloor \cdot \rfloor$ denotes rounding to the nearest value from $\mathbb{C}$ to $\mathbb{Z}[i]$ for each coefficient. The encoding of matrices is illustrated in Fig. 1. The encoding and decoding can be efficiently performed using the three-dimensional discrete Fourier transform.




Figure 1: Structure of the encoding.

3.2 Encryption and Key Switching

The security of our scheme is not determined by RLWE over R'_q but in R_q^2 . For a secret key $s(X, W) \in R_q$, we use an RLWE encryption $(c_0, c_1) \in R_q^2$ satisfying $c_0 + c_1 \cdot s = \mathbf{m} + e$ for a message polynomial $\mathbf{m}$ and small noise e . As our encoded message is in R' as in Eq. (3), we use n distinct RLWE ciphertexts for the encryption of a message $m \in R'$:

$$\text{ct}(m) = \{(b_j, a_j) \in R_q^2 \mid b_j = m_j + e_j - a_j \cdot s\}_{j=0, \dots, n-1} \in R_q^{2n},$$

where $m(X, Y, W) = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} m_j(X, W) \cdot Y^j$. Equivalently, the ciphertext can be represented as

$$\text{ct}(m) = (b, a) = (m - a \cdot s + e, a) \in R_q'^2,$$

where $b = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} b_j Y^j$, $a = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j Y^j$, and $e = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} e_j Y^j \in R'$, since $s(X, W)$ is constant with respect to Y .

We summarize below a basic RLWE-based encryption scheme without homomorphic operations:

Basic RLWE-based encryption scheme:

- **Setup**($1^\lambda, n, p$): Choose ciphertext moduli q and q_o , and other parameters ($\chi_{\text{key}} = \chi_{\text{key}}(\lambda, n, p, qq_o)$, $\chi_{\text{err}} = \chi_{\text{err}}(\lambda, n, p, qq_o)$) to ensure that the scheme is based on an RLWE instance over R_{qq_o} that achieves λ -bit security against known attacks. Let $\text{params} = (n, p, q, q_o, \chi_{\text{key}}, \chi_{\text{err}})$.
- **SecretKeyGen**(params): Draw $s \leftarrow \chi_{\text{key}}$; a usual choice of key distribution is ternary or Gaussian. Set $\text{sk} = (1, s)$. We emphasize that the key is sampled from R , not R' .
- **Encrypt**($\text{params}, m, \text{sk}$): Sample a random polynomial $a \leftarrow R'_q$ and noise $e \leftarrow \chi_{\text{err}}$. Output the ciphertext $(b = -a \cdot s + m + e, a)$.
- **Decrypt**($\text{params}, \text{ct}, \text{sk}$): Output $\langle \text{ct}, \text{sk} \rangle = b + a \cdot s$.
- **Encode**(params, T): Output $\lfloor \sigma^{-1}(T) \cdot \Delta \rfloor$, where $T \in \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})^{\varphi(p)}$.
- **Decode**(params, m): Output $\sigma(m)/\Delta$.

We omit the public-key encryption variant here for the ease of explanation, but it is straightforward.

Key Switching We define two slightly different key-switching functions depending on the source secret key: $\text{Switch}_{\text{small}} : R' \times R^{2d_g} \mapsto R'^2$ and $\text{Switch}_{\text{big}} : R' \times R'^{2d_g} \mapsto R'^2$. The key switching $\text{Switch}_{\text{small}}$ is used when the source secret key is in R , whereas $\text{Switch}_{\text{big}}$ is used when the source secret key is in the extended ring R' . The destination secret key is always in R .

Given a polynomial $a \in R'$ and a key-switching key from $s'(X, W) \in R$ to $s(X, W) \in R$, $\text{ksk}_{s'(X, W) \mapsto s(X, W)} := \text{RLWE}'_{s(X, W)}(q_o s'(X, W)) \in R_{qq_o}^{2d_g}$, the operation $\text{Switch}_{\text{small}}$ is defined using Switch in Eq. (2) as follows:

- $\text{Switch}_{\text{small}}(a, \text{ksk}_{s'(X, W) \mapsto s(X, W)})$: Output

$$\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \text{Switch}(a_j, \text{ksk}_{s'(X, W) \mapsto s(X, W)}) \cdot Y^j,$$

$$\text{where } a(X, Y, W) = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j(X, W) Y^j.$$

One may regard $\text{ksk}_{s'(X, W) \mapsto s(X, W)}$ as the key-switching key for R' with zero Y -degree.

Similarly, given a polynomial $a \in R'$ and a key-switching key from $s'(X, Y, W) \in R'$ to $s(X, W) \in R$, $\text{ksk}_{s'(X, Y, W) \mapsto s(X, W)} := \text{RLWE}'_{s(X, W)}(q_o s'(X, Y, W)) \in R_{qq_o}^{2d_g}$, the operation $\text{Switch}_{\text{big}}$ is defined as follows:

- $\text{Switch}_{\text{big}}(a, \text{ksk}_{s'(X, Y, W) \mapsto s(X, W)})$: Output $\text{Switch}(a, \text{ksk}_{s'(X, Y, W) \mapsto s(X, W)})$.

The key switching $\text{Switch}_{\text{big}}$ requires Y -axis NTT for each component of $h(a)$, whereas $\text{Switch}_{\text{small}}$ requires NTT only for W and X . Thus, $\text{Switch}_{\text{big}}$ is more expensive than $\text{Switch}_{\text{small}}$, but their asymptotic complexity is equivalent; the time complexity of NTT in all X, Y , and W axes is $O(n^2 \varphi(p) \log(n^2 \varphi(p))) = O(n^2 p \log(np))$, and the time complexity of n independent NTTs in the X and W axes is $n \cdot O(n \varphi(p) \log(n \varphi(p))) = O(n^2 p \log(np))$.

3.3 Security Analysis

In our scheme, we employ ciphertexts defined over both R'_q and R_q , and the largest parameter we use is R'_{qq_o} for key-switching keys. However, a ciphertext over R'_q can be represented as n distinct ciphertexts over R_q . Therefore, its security is equivalent to that of a standard RLWE ciphertext with a non-power-of-two ring $R_{qq_o} \cong \mathbb{Z}_{qq_o}[X] / \langle \Phi_{4np}(X) \rangle$. The **Setup** procedure selects parameters such as the ciphertext modulus qq_o , key distribution, and noise distribution to ensure λ -bit security against known attacks on the RLWE problem defined over R_{qq_o} . We refer the reader to [LPR13] for a detailed security analysis.

3.4 Homomorphic Matrix Multiplication

Polynomial View of Plaintext-Plaintext Matrix Multiplication As a toy example, we first consider the multiplication of two matrices $A, B \in \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})$. This is equivalent to the case of $p = 1$, i.e., $\Phi_p(W) = W - 1$, in the ring R' . We then extend to the case of $p > 1$, which enables the multiplication of $\varphi(p)$ matrices simultaneously.

Let polynomials $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}[i][X, Y] / \langle X^n - i, Y^n - i \rangle$ satisfy $a(\zeta_j, \zeta_k) = A_{jk}$ and $b(\zeta_j, \zeta_k) = B_{jk}$. Let $C = AB^*$ be the product of A and the conjugate transpose of B . In other words,

$$C_{jk} = \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} A_{j\nu} B_{\nu k}^* = \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} A_{j\nu} \overline{B_{k\nu}}.$$

Observation 3.1. *Let a polynomial $a(X, Y) \in \mathbb{Z}[i][X, Y] / \langle X^n - i, Y^n - i \rangle$ satisfy $a(\zeta_j, \zeta_k) = A_{jk}$, i.e., a is the encoding of matrix A . Then, $a_{\text{conj}} = \overline{a}(X^{-1}, Y^{-1})$ satisfies $a_{\text{conj}}(\zeta_j, \zeta_k) = \overline{A_{jk}}$. In other words, a_{conj} is the encoding of $\overline{A}$.*

Proof. Recall that $\zeta_j^{-1} = \overline{\zeta_j}$ for all j . Let $a(X, Y) = \sum_{x=0}^{n-1} \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} a_{xy} X^x Y^y$, for $a_{xy} \in \mathbb{Z}[i]$. Then,

$$a_{\text{conj}}(\zeta_j, \zeta_k) = \sum_{x=0}^{n-1} \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} \overline{a_{xy}} \zeta_j^{-x} \zeta_k^{-y} = \overline{\sum_{x=0}^{n-1} \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} a_{xy} \zeta_j^x \zeta_k^y} = \overline{A_{jk}}. \quad \square$$

Observation 3.2. *The polynomial $a' = \overline{a}(Y^{-1}, X^{-1})$ is the encoding of A^* . In other words, a' satisfies $a'(X = \zeta_j, Y = \zeta_k) = \overline{A_{kj}}$.*

Proof. $\overline{a}(Y^{-1}, X^{-1})$ is the substitution of X and Y in $\overline{a}(X^{-1}, Y^{-1})$. $\square$

Lemma 3.3. *For $\zeta_j = \zeta^{5^j}$, where ζ is a $4n$ -th primitive root of unity, we have*

$$\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \zeta_j^k = \begin{cases} n, & k = 0, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Proof. We have $5^j \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$, and we define $n_j = \frac{5^j - 1}{4}$. Then, $\{n_j\}$ forms a complete residue system modulo n . Let $\omega = \zeta^4$. Then we have

$$\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \zeta_j^k = \zeta^k \cdot \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \omega^{kn_j} = \zeta^k \cdot \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \omega^{kj}.$$

This equals n when $k = 0$. For $k \neq 0$, the sum of the geometric progression yields $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \omega^{kj} = \frac{1 - \omega^{kn}}{1 - \omega^k} = 0$. $\square$

We note that Theorem 3.3 is *not limited to* complex numbers, but also holds in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ for $q \equiv 1 \pmod{4n}$.

Definition 3.4 (Trace Operation). The trace over Z , $Tr_Z(a)$, is defined as the constant term in Z of a , namely the degree-zero component with respect to Z while possibly depending on the other variables.

Theorem 3.5 (Polynomial view of matrix multiplication). *By introducing an auxiliary variable Z , we let $c(X, Y) = Tr_Z(a(X, Z) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}))$, where $a(\zeta_j, \zeta_k) = A_{jk}$ and $b(\zeta_j, \zeta_k) = B_{jk}$. Then, $c(\zeta_j, \zeta_k) = \frac{1}{n} C_{jk}$ for $C = AB^*$.*

Proof. First, we define a polynomial

$$c'(X, Y) = \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} a(X, \zeta_\nu) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, \zeta_\nu^{-1}). \quad (4)$$

Substituting X and Y with ζ_j and ζ_k , respectively, yields

$$c'(\zeta_j, \zeta_k) = \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} a(\zeta_j, \zeta_\nu) \cdot \bar{b}(\zeta_k^{-1}, \zeta_\nu^{-1}) = \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} A_{j\nu} \overline{B_{k\nu}} = [AB^*]_{jk}.$$

Therefore, c' is the encoding of AB^* .

Now, let $a(X, Y) = \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} a_y(X) \cdot Y^y$ and $b(X, Y) = \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} b_y(X) \cdot Y^y$. Then, $\bar{b}(Y^{-1}, \zeta_\nu^{-1}) = \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} \overline{b_y(Y^{-1})} \zeta_\nu^{-y}$. Rewriting Eq. (4), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} c'(X, Y) &= \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} a(X, \zeta_\nu) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, \zeta_\nu^{-1}) = \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j(X) \zeta_\nu^j \cdot \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} \overline{b_k(Y^{-1})} \zeta_\nu^{-k} \\ &= \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} a_j(X) \overline{b_k(Y^{-1})} \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} \zeta_\nu^{j-k}. \end{aligned}$$

The Theorem 3.3 gives us $\sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} \zeta_\nu^{j-k}$ is n if $j = k$ and 0 otherwise. Hence,

$$c'(X, Y) = n \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j(X) \cdot \overline{b_j(Y^{-1})}.$$

By definition, $\sum_{j=0}^{n-1} a_j(X) \cdot \overline{b_j(Y^{-1})}$ is the Z -degree-zero coefficient of $a(X, Z) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1})$, and thus $c = \frac{1}{n} c'$. $\square$

Trace by Matrix Multiplication in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}[i])$ The above trace operation $Tr_Z(a(X, Z) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}))$ may seem complicated, but it can be computed via matrix multiplication in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}[i])$ as in the following theorem.

Theorem 3.6 (Trace as matrix form). *For polynomials $a = \sum_{j,k} a_{jk} X^j Y^k$ and $b = \sum_{j,k} b_{jk} X^j Y^k$, let $\bar{b}(X^{-1}, Y) = \sum_{j,k} \overline{b_{jk}} X^{-j} Y^k = \sum_{j,k} b'_{jk} X^j Y^k$, and define two matrices A and B' by $[A]_{jk} = a_{jk}$ and $[B']_{jk} = b'_{jk}$. Then,*

$$c(X, Y) = Tr_Z(a(X, Z) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1})) = \sum_{j,k} [AB'^T]_{jk} X^j Y^k.$$

Proof. Expanding Tr_Z , we have

$$\begin{aligned} Tr_Z(a(X, Z) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1})) &= Tr_Z \left(\sum_{j,u} a_{ju} X^j Z^u \cdot \sum_{k,v} \overline{b_{kv}} Y^{-k} Z^{-v} \right) \\ &= \sum_j \sum_u a_{ju} X^j \sum_k \overline{b_{ku}} Y^{-k} = \sum_j \sum_k \sum_u a_{ju} b'_{ku} X^j Y^k. \end{aligned}$$

By definition, $\sum_u a_{ju} b'_{ku}$ is the (j, k) -th entry of AB'^T . $\square$

We note that the coefficients b'_{jk} are easily obtained from b , by coefficient permutation and sign changes. Hence, the trace can be computed directly using matrix multiplication whose entries are the coefficients of the input polynomials.

Extension to practical parameters with $p > 1$ The earlier toy example reduces the multiplication of two matrices in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})$, corresponding to the $p = 1$ case for the ring R' . However, in practical parameter sets, the number of coefficients of the polynomial used for RLWE ranges from 2^{12} to 2^{16} to support a sufficient number of multiplications or bootstrapping. Matrix multiplication of size from 2048×2048 (with no further multiplications after a single multiplication) to 32768×32768 (parameter for bootstrapping) is unlikely to be practical.

Hence, we adopt RLWE with a non-power-of-two ring, which has been well studied in the literature [LPR13, GHS12b, HS20, CKY18]. The multiplication of encoded matrices in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})$ can be represented by matrix multiplication in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}[i])$, whereas a matrix in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})$ is encoded into a polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}[i][X, Y] / \langle X^n - i, Y^n - i \rangle$. We extend the idea to the case of $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})^{\varphi(p)} \cong \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C}^{\varphi(p)}) \cong \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C}[W] / \langle \Phi_p(W) \rangle)$, since $\varphi(p)$ complex numbers can be encoded in $R^{(p)} = \mathbb{Z}[i][W] / \langle \Phi_p(W) \rangle$ via the canonical embedding.

We let two polynomials

$$a, b \in R' = \mathbb{Z}[i][X, Y, W] / \langle X^n - i, Y^n - i, \Phi_p(W) \rangle,$$

satisfy $a(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) = A_{j,k}^{(\ell)}$ and $b(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) = B_{j,k}^{(\ell)}$ for the matrices $\{A^{(\ell)}\}_{\ell \in [0, \varphi(p))}$ and $\{B^{(\ell)}\}_{\ell \in [0, \varphi(p))} \in \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})^{\varphi(p)}$, respectively. We can naturally extend Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 3.5 to the following batched-matrix version.

Observation 3.7. *Let a polynomial $a \in R'$ encode the matrices $\{A^{(\ell)}\}_{\ell \in [0, \varphi(p))}$; in other words, $a(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) = A_{j,k}^{(\ell)}$. Then $a'(X, Y, W) = \bar{a}(Y^{-1}, X^{-1}, W^{-1})$ is the encoding of $\{A^{(\ell)*}\}_{\ell \in [0, \varphi(p))}$.*

Proof. By definition, we have $\bar{a}(Y^{-1}, X^{-1}, W^{-1}) = \sum_{j,k,\ell} \bar{a}_{j,k,\ell} Y^{-j} X^{-k} W^{-\ell}$. Then, by substituting X, Y, W with $\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell$, respectively, we have

$$\begin{aligned} a'(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) &= \bar{a}(\zeta_k^{-1}, \zeta_j^{-1}, \eta_\ell^{-1}) = \sum_{x=0}^{n-1} \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} \sum_{z=0}^{\varphi(p)-1} \overline{a_{xyz}} \zeta_k^{-x} \zeta_j^{-y} \eta_\ell^{-z} \\ &= \sum_{x=0}^{n-1} \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} \sum_{z=0}^{\varphi(p)-1} \overline{a_{xyz}} \bar{\zeta}_k^x \bar{\zeta}_j^y \bar{\eta}_\ell^z = \overline{A_{kj}^{(\ell)}}, \end{aligned}$$

where we use the fact that $\eta_\ell^{-1} = \bar{\eta}_\ell$ as η_ℓ is a primitive root of unity. $\square$

Theorem 3.8 (Batched matrix multiplication). *Let $c = \text{Tr}_Z(a(X, Z, W) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1}))$, where $a(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) = A_{j,k}^{(\ell)}$ and $b(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) = B_{j,k}^{(\ell)}$. Then*

$$c(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) = \frac{1}{n} [A^{(\ell)} B^{(\ell)*}]_{jk}.$$

Proof. We define the partial decryption $a_{jk}(W) = a(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, W)$ and $b_{jk}(W) = b(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, W)$, where $a_{jk}(W), b_{jk}(W) \in \mathbb{C}[W] / \langle \Phi_p(W) \rangle$.

Then, we have $\bar{b}(\zeta_j^{-1}, \zeta_k^{-1}, W^{-1}) = \bar{b}_{jk}(W^{-1})$ and $\bar{b}_{jk}(\eta_\ell^{-1}) = \overline{B_{jk}^{(\ell)}}$. We reuse the proof of Theorem 3.5 by replacing $A_{j\nu}$ and $\bar{B}_{k\nu}$ with $a_{j\nu}(W)$ and $\overline{b_{k\nu}(W^{-1})}$, respectively. Then we obtain

$$c(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, W) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} a_{j\nu}(W) \cdot \overline{b_{k\nu}(W^{-1})}.$$

Substituting W with η_ℓ gives

$$\begin{aligned} c(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} a_{j\nu}(\eta_\ell) \cdot \overline{b_{k\nu}}(\eta_\ell^{-1}) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} A_{j\nu}^{(\ell)} \cdot \overline{B_{k\nu}^{(\ell)}} \\ &= \frac{1}{n} [A^{(\ell)} B^{(\ell)*}]_{jk}. \end{aligned} \quad \square$$

Theorem 3.6 can be extended to the ring $R'_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[i][X, Y, W] / \langle X^n - i, Y^n - i, \Phi_p(W) \rangle \cong R_q^{(p)}[X, Y] / \langle X^n - i, Y^n - i \rangle$, where $R_q^{(p)} = R^{(p)} / qR^{(p)}$. Then, the trace operation $Tr_Z(a(X, Z, W) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1}))$ can be computed by matrix multiplication in $\mathcal{M}_n(R_q^{(p)})$ as in the following corollary.

Corollary 3.9. *For polynomials $a, b \in R'$, let $\bar{b}(X^{-1}, Y, W^{-1}) = \sum_{j,k,\ell} b'_{jkl} X^j Y^k W^\ell$, and define matrices $\hat{A}$ and $\hat{B}'$ in $\mathcal{M}_n(R_q^{(p)})$ by $[\hat{A}]_{jk} = \sum_\ell a_{jkl} W^\ell$ and $[\hat{B}']_{jk} = \sum_\ell b'_{jkl} W^\ell$. Then,*

$$c(X, Y, W) = Tr_Z(a(X, Z, W) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1})) = \sum_{j,k} [\hat{C}]_{jk} X^j Y^k,$$

where $\hat{C} = \hat{A} \hat{B}'^T$.

Remark 3.10. Following to Theorem 3.9 we can find the coefficients of $c(X, Y, W)$ by a matrix multiplication in $\mathcal{M}_n(R_q^{(p)})$. Besides, $\hat{B}'$ can be directly obtained from b by coefficient permutation and sign changes.

Remark 3.11. When a and b are represented in the NTT domain along the W -axis, we can compute $\hat{A} \hat{B}'^T$ through $\varphi(p)$ independent multiplications in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}[i])$.

For ease of notation, the trace operation $Tr_Z(a(X, Z, W) \cdot \bar{b}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1}))$ is denoted by $a \otimes b$.

Encrypted Matrix Multiplication So far, we have shown that the multiplication of two sets of matrices can be computed by the trace of their encoded polynomials. Now, we consider the encrypted matrix multiplication of two ciphertexts $\text{ct}(u)$ and $\text{ct}(v)$, where u and v are the encodings of matrices $\{U^{(\ell)}\}$ and $\{V^{(\ell)}\}$. We define $\text{ct}(u) = (b_u, a_u)$ and $\text{ct}(v) = (b_v, a_v)$ in $R_q'^2$, satisfy the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Decrypt}(\text{ct}(u)) &= b_u(X, Y, W) + a_u(X, Y, W)s(X, W) = u + e_u \text{ and} \\ \text{Decrypt}(\text{ct}(v)) &= b_v(X, Y, W) + a_v(X, Y, W)s(X, W) = v + e_v, \end{aligned}$$

where $s(X, W)$ is the secret key in R , and $e_u, e_v \in R'$ are small noise polynomials. Then, the matrix multiplication of two ciphertexts is given as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct}(u) \otimes \text{ct}(v) &:= (b_u, a_u) \otimes (b_v, a_v) \\ &= (b_u \otimes b_v, b_u \otimes a_v, a_u \otimes b_v, a_u \otimes a_v) \in R_q'^4. \end{aligned}$$

The resulting ciphertext is a 4-component ciphertext in $R_q'^4$. The decryption of the resulting ciphertext is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Decrypt}(\text{ct}(u) \otimes \text{ct}(v)) &= (b_u \otimes b_v) + (a_u \otimes b_v)s(X, W) + (b_u \otimes a_v)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \\ &\quad + (a_u \otimes a_v)s(X, W)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \\ &= (u + e_u) \otimes (v + e_v). \end{aligned}$$

Here, we used the fact that s is defined in R , not R' , so it does not depend on Y . The following theorem shows the correctness of the decryption.

Theorem 3.12 (Correctness of encrypted matrix multiplication). *Let $\text{ct}(u)$ and $\text{ct}(v)$ be ciphertexts encrypting $u, v \in R'$, respectively. Then, the decryption of $\text{ct}(u) \otimes \text{ct}(v)$ is given as follows:*

$$(u + e_u) \otimes (v + e_v) = (b_u \otimes b_v) + (a_u \otimes b_v)s(X, W) + (b_u \otimes a_v)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) + (a_u \otimes a_v)s(X, W)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}).$$

Proof. By definition, we have

$$(u + e_u) \otimes (v + e_v) = \text{Tr}_Z \left((u + e_u)(X, Z, W) \cdot \overline{(v + e_v)(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1})} \right).$$

The right term $\overline{(v + e_v)(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1})}$ is equivalent to

$$\overline{b_v + a_v s}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1}) = \overline{b_v}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1}) + \overline{a_v}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1})\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}),$$

as we have the ring automorphism $X \mapsto X^{-1}, Y \mapsto Y^{-1}, W \mapsto W^{-1}$ in R' .

Similarly, the left term $(u + e_u)(X, Z, W)$ is equivalent to

$$b_u(X, Z, W) + a_u(X, Z, W)s(X, W).$$

By expanding the equation, we have

$$\begin{aligned} (u + e_u) \otimes (v + e_v) &= \text{Tr}_Z (b_u(X, Z, W) \cdot \overline{b_v}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1})) \\ &\quad + \text{Tr}_Z (a_u(X, Z, W) \cdot s(X, W) \cdot \overline{b_v}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1})) \\ &\quad + \text{Tr}_Z (b_u(X, Z, W) \cdot \overline{a_v}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1}) \cdot \bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1})) \\ &\quad + \text{Tr}_Z (a_u(X, Z, W) \cdot s(X, W) \cdot \overline{a_v}(Y^{-1}, Z^{-1}, W^{-1}) \cdot \bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1})). \end{aligned}$$

Note that $s(X, W)$ and $\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1})$ do not depend on the auxiliary variable Z , and thus can be taken out of the trace operation. Finally, we have

$$\begin{aligned} (u + e_u) \otimes (v + e_v) &= (b_u \otimes b_v) + (a_u \otimes b_v)s(X, W) + (b_u \otimes a_v)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \\ &\quad + (a_u \otimes a_v)s(X, W)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}). \end{aligned} \quad \square$$

As explained in the earlier section, the **Encode** function scales up the input matrix by Δ . Thus, the output ciphertext is scaled up by Δ^2 , and we can handle the noise using the rescaling function as in the CKKS scheme [CKKS17].

3.5 Relinearization for Matrix Multiplication

Theorem 3.12 shows that the encrypted matrix multiplication of two ciphertexts $\text{ct}(u)$ and $\text{ct}(v)$ results in a 4-component ciphertext. Therefore, the decryption of the resulting ciphertext involves multiplication with $s(X, W)$, $\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1})$, and $s(X, W)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1})$. The size of the ciphertext increases exponentially after consecutive multiplications, and the computational complexity of homomorphic operations also increases accordingly. To avoid this, we adopt the relinearization technique to reduce the size of the ciphertext from 4 to 2.

The key switching requires two key-switching keys:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ksk}_{\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \mapsto s} &= \text{RLWE}'_s(q_o \bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1})) \text{ and} \\ \text{ksk}_{s(X, W)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \mapsto s} &= \text{RLWE}'_s(q_o s(X, W)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1})) \in R'^{2d_g}_{q q_o}. \end{aligned}$$

Let

$$\text{ct}(u) \otimes \text{ct}(v) = (b_u \otimes b_v, b_u \otimes a_v, a_u \otimes b_v, a_u \otimes a_v) = (d_0, d_1, d_2, d_3) \in R'_q{}^4.$$

Then, key switching outputs the following ciphertext:

$$(d_0, d_1) + \text{Switch}_{\text{big}}(d_2, \text{ksk}_{\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \mapsto s}) + \text{Switch}_{\text{big}}(d_3, \text{ksk}_{s(X, W)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \mapsto s}).$$

which is an encryption of $d_0 + d_1 \cdot s + d_2 \cdot \bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) + d_3 \cdot s(X, W)\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \approx u \otimes v$.

3.6 Other Homomorphic Operations

Beyond matrix multiplication, we can naturally define other operations: addition, Hadamard product, transpose, conjugation, intra-matrix rotations (rows and columns), and inter-matrix rotations. We can directly apply the bootstrapping operations of the standard CKKS scheme on R . Homomorphic operations on two ciphertexts $\text{ct}(u) = (b_u, a_u)$ and $\text{ct}(v) = (b_v, a_v)$ are explained below, where u and v are the encodings of matrices $\{U^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$ and $\{V^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$.

Plaintext-Ciphertext Matrix Multiplication The pt-ct matrix multiplication is much simpler than ct-ct matrix multiplication. Given a ciphertext $\text{ct}(u) = (b_u, a_u)$ and plaintext v , we can calculate $(b_u \otimes v, a_u \otimes v)$, which decrypts to $u \otimes v$, as the secret key can be taken out of trace. Thus, we can perform right multiplication by a matrix.

Remark 3.13 (Transposed encoding). Depending on the application, left multiplication by a plaintext may be preferred. In that case, we simply encode the transposed matrix, and the decoding is also done considering the transposition. Specifically, we can use **Encode** to output $[\varsigma^{-1}(T) \cdot \Delta]$, where

$$\varsigma(u) = \left\{ U_{jk}^{(\ell)} = u(\zeta_k, \zeta_j, \eta_\ell) : j, k \in [0, n) \text{ and } \ell \in [0, \varphi(p)) \right\}.$$

Then, the same operation $u \otimes v$ computes $\{V^{(\ell)*} U^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$ instead of $\{U^{(\ell)} V^{(\ell)*}\}_\ell$.

Addition The addition of ciphertexts $(b_u + b_v, a_u + a_v)$ is a valid encryption of $u + v$, and $u + v$ encodes $\{U^{(\ell)} + V^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$.

Hadamard Product The ciphertext $(d_0, d_1, d_2) = (b_u b_v, b_u a_v + b_v a_u, a_u a_v)$ is an encryption of $u \cdot v$, since

$$d_0 + d_1 \cdot s(X, W) + d_2 \cdot s(X, W)^2 \approx u \cdot v,$$

where $u \cdot v$ encodes the Hadamard product of $\{U^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$ and $\{V^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$. Since the multiplication result is a three-component ciphertext, we need relinearization, i.e., key switching from $(1, s, s^2)$ to $(1, s)$.

The relinearization key for the Hadamard product is smaller by a factor of n than that for matrix multiplication. As $s(X, W)^2$ has no Y -component, i.e., $s(X, W)^2 \in R$ (not R'), the key-switching key is also in $R_{qqo}^{2d_g}$. We then apply the same key switching to each Y -coefficient of the ciphertext. The switched ciphertext is

$$(d_0, d_1) + \text{Switch}_{\text{small}}(d_2, \text{ksk}_{s^2 \mapsto s}).$$

Note that, for the Hadamard product, we use $\text{Switch}_{\text{small}}$, and thus the amortized key-switching cost is equivalent to other FHE schemes over R .

Conjugation Conjugation of each matrix in $\{U^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$ can be computed using a ring automorphism of R' , namely $(I, X, Y, W) \mapsto (I^{-1}, X^{-1}, Y^{-1}, W^{-1})$. We have the following decryption equation:

$$\overline{b_u}(X^{-1}, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) + \overline{a_u}(X^{-1}, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \cdot \overline{s}(X^{-1}, W^{-1}) \approx \overline{u}(X^{-1}, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}).$$

We then apply the same key switching, $\overline{s}(X^{-1}, W^{-1}) \mapsto s(X, W)$, to each Y -coefficient of the ciphertext. The homomorphic conjugation outputs the ciphertext

$$(\overline{b_u}(X^{-1}, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}), 0) + \text{Switch}_{\text{small}}(\overline{a_u}(X^{-1}, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}), \text{ksk}_{\overline{s}(X^{-1}, W^{-1}) \mapsto s}),$$

where the key-switching key $\text{ksk}_{\overline{s}(X^{-1}, W^{-1}) \mapsto s}$ is defined in $R_{qqo}^{2d_g}$ as in the Hadamard multiplication.

Intra-Matrix Rotation: Rows We use the ring automorphism $X \mapsto X^\alpha$ for rotation. For any odd number α , we obtain an encryption of $u(X^\alpha, W)$ under the secret key $s(X^\alpha, W)$:

$$b_u(X^\alpha, Y, W) + a_u(X^\alpha, Y, W) \cdot s(X^\alpha, W) \approx u(X^\alpha, Y, W).$$

We use odd numbers represented as $5^\nu \pmod{4n}$. The evaluation of $u(X^{5^\nu}, Y, W)$ at $(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell)$ is $u(\zeta_{[j+\nu]_n}, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) = U_{[j+\nu]_n, k}^{(\ell)}$. Thus, $u(X^{5^\nu}, Y, W)$ encodes the matrix obtained from U by cyclically shifting its rows by ν positions.

We then apply key switching to change the secret key from $s(X^{5^\nu}, W)$ to $s(X, W)$. In summary, the rotation of rows by k is given by

$$(b_u(X^{5^\nu}, Y, W), 0) + \text{Switch}_{\text{small}}\left(a_u(X^{5^\nu}, Y, W), \text{ksk}_{s(X^{5^\nu}, W) \mapsto s(X, W)}\right),$$

where the key-switching key lies in $R_{qqo}^{2d_g}$, as in the Hadamard multiplication.

Intra-Matrix Rotation: Columns To rotate the columns, we use the ring automorphism $Y \mapsto Y^{5^\nu}$. In other words, we have

$$b_u(X, Y^{5^\nu}, W) + a_u(X, Y^{5^\nu}, W) \cdot s(X, W) = u(X, Y^{5^\nu}, W).$$

The evaluation of $u(X, Y^{5^\nu}, W)$ at $\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell$ equals $u(\zeta_j, \zeta_{[k+\nu]_n}, \eta_\ell) = U_{j, [k+\nu]_n}^{(\ell)}$. Note that column rotation does not require key switching, as the secret key has no Y -component. Hence, column rotation is performed simply by coefficient permutation and sign changes.

Inter-Matrix Rotation Inter-matrix rotation rotates the set of matrices $\{U^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$ to $\{U^{([\ell+\nu]_{\varphi(p)})}\}_\ell$. We use the ring automorphism $W \mapsto W^\alpha$ for any α coprime to p . For a generator γ of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, let $\eta_\ell = \eta^{\gamma^\ell}$. Then, the evaluation of $u(X, Y, W^{\gamma^\nu})$ at $\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell$ equals $u(\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_{\ell'}) = U_{j, k}^{(\ell')}$, where $\ell' \equiv [\ell + \nu]_{\varphi(p)}$. Thus, using key switching from $s(X, W^{\gamma^\nu})$ to $s(X, W)$, we can rotate the set of matrices by amount ν as follows:

$$(b_u(X, Y, W^{\gamma^\nu}), 0) + \text{Switch}_{\text{small}}\left(a_u(X, Y, W^{\gamma^\nu}), \text{ksk}_{s(X, W^{\gamma^\nu}) \mapsto s(X, W)}\right),$$

where the key-switching key size is small, as it lies in $R_{qqo}^{2d_g}$.

Transpose The transpose of each matrix in $\{U^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$ is computed by permuting $(X, Y) \mapsto (Y, X)$. The ciphertext $(b_u(Y, X, W), a_u(Y, X, W))$ encrypts $u(Y, X, W)$, since

$$b_u(Y, X, W) + a_u(Y, X, W) \cdot s(Y, W) \approx u(Y, X, W).$$

The evaluation of $u(Y, X, W)$ at $\zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell$ equals $u(\zeta_k, \zeta_j, \eta_\ell) = U_{kj}^{(\ell)}$. We need a key switching from $s(Y, W)$ to $s(X, W)$, as follows:

$$(b_u(Y, X, W), 0) + \text{Switch}_{\text{big}}(a_u(Y, X, W), \text{ksk}_{s(Y, W) \mapsto s(X, W)}) .$$

The switching key for transpose is defined in $R_{qq_o}'^{2d_g}$, as in the matrix-multiplication relinearization keys, and thus its key size is larger than the keys for the Hadamard multiplication and rotations. One obvious memory optimization is to first perform conjugation and then conjugate transpose by reusing the key for matrix multiplication.

Conjugate Transpose Conjugate transpose is also a common transposition for complex matrices. We use the ring automorphism $(I, X, Y, W) \mapsto (I^{-1}, Y^{-1}, X^{-1}, W^{-1})$ for conjugate transpose. A key-switching key from $\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1})$ to $s(X, W)$ is required to switch the key of the ciphertext $(\bar{b}_u(Y^{-1}, X^{-1}, W^{-1}), \bar{a}_u(Y^{-1}, X^{-1}, W^{-1}))$. We already have the switching key $\text{ksk}_{\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \mapsto s}$ for matrix multiplication, and thus no additional switching key is required for conjugate transpose. The conjugate transpose outputs the ciphertext

$$(\bar{b}_u(Y^{-1}, X^{-1}, W^{-1}), 0) + \text{Switch}_{\text{big}}(\bar{a}_u(Y^{-1}, X^{-1}, W^{-1}), \text{ksk}_{\bar{s}(Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \mapsto s}) .$$

Bootstrapping We can directly apply the bootstrapping of the standard CKKS scheme on R_q , independently for each Y -coefficient of the ciphertext. Rescaling decreases the ciphertext modulus, and bootstrapping then refreshes the ciphertext (b_u, a_u) by homomorphically increasing the modulus, resulting in a ciphertext that encrypts $u + e_{\text{bs}}$ for a small noise e_{bs} . Bootstrapping does not alter the structure of the ciphertext, so the bootstrapped ciphertext still encrypts $\{U^{(\ell)}\}_\ell$. We refer readers to [CKY18] for details on CKKS bootstrapping over a non-power-of-two cyclotomic ring.

4 Generalization to Integer Matrices

In Section 3, we described the encoding and encrypted matrix multiplication over the complex numbers using a CKKS-esque encoding. In this section, we show that this approach can be naturally extended to integer matrices using a BGV-like encoding. In particular, we can encode $2\varphi(p)$ matrices of size $n \times n$ over $\mathbb{Z}_t$, for a plaintext modulus t such that $t \equiv 1 \pmod{4np}$. The number of matrices encoded in a single polynomial is therefore twice as many as in the complex-number case.

4.1 Encoding of Integer Matrices

The encoding uses roots of unity in $\mathbb{Z}_t$ and is similar to the complex-number encoding in Section 3. We choose the message modulus t such that $t \equiv 1 \pmod{4np}$, so that the polynomial $X^n - I$ (resp. $Y^n - I, \Phi_p(W)$) splits into n (resp. $n, \varphi(p)$) distinct linear factors over $\mathbb{Z}_t[i] \cong \mathbb{Z}_t[I]/\langle I^2 + 1 \rangle$. The observation here is that the imaginary unit $\mathcal{I} = \sqrt{-1}$ always exists in $\mathbb{Z}_t$ since $t \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$. In particular, $\mathcal{I} = \zeta^n$ for a primitive $4n$ -th root of unity $\zeta \in \mathbb{Z}_t$.

We now define the encoding of $2\varphi(p)$ matrices in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_t)$ as a polynomial in R'_t . A polynomial $a \in R'_t$ encodes $2\varphi(p)$ matrices $M^{(\ell, \pm)} \in \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_t)$, for $\ell = 0, \dots, \varphi(p) - 1$. Hence, the encoding

is defined as the inverse of the following map $R'_t \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_t)^{2\varphi(p)}$:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_{\text{int}}(m) &= \{M^{(\ell,\pm)} : M_{jk}^{(\ell,+)} = m(\mathcal{I}, \zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell), \\ &\quad M_{jk}^{(\ell,-)} = m(-\mathcal{I}, \zeta_j^{-1}, \zeta_k^{-1}, \eta_\ell^{-1})\}_{j,k \in [0,n), \ell \in [0,\varphi(p))}, \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where $\zeta_j = \zeta^{5^j}$ for a primitive $4n$ -th root of unity $\zeta \in \mathbb{Z}_t$, and $\eta_\ell = \eta^{\gamma^\ell}$ for a primitive p -th root of unity $\eta \in \mathbb{Z}_t$ with γ a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

The encoding for $M_{jk}^{(\ell,\pm)}$ may seem unusual, but it is in fact an extension of the way the original BGV/BFV schemes encode N elements in $\mathbb{Z}_t[X]/\langle X^N + 1 \rangle$ using two different degree- $N/2$ cyclic subgroups of $\mathbb{Z}_{2N}^*$. In the proposed encoding method, the ring automorphism $(I, X, Y, W) \mapsto (I^{-1}, X^{-1}, Y^{-1}, W^{-1})$ (which corresponds to complex conjugation in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{C})$) corresponds to a swap between $M^{(\ell,+)}$ and $M^{(\ell,-)}$. The encoded matrices are illustrated in Fig. 2, where the two sets of $\varphi(p)$ matrices are represented by the evaluations at $(\mathcal{I}, \zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell)$ (left) and $(-\mathcal{I}, \zeta_j^{-1}, \zeta_k^{-1}, \eta_\ell^{-1})$ (right).




Figure 2: The encoding of $2\varphi(p)$ integer matrices in R'_t .

4.2 Encryption for Integer Matrices

Encryption Scheme We summarize below the RLWE-based encryption scheme for integer matrices, which is similar to the BGV scheme [BGV12]; note that we can also use the BFV scheme [Bra12a, FV12] in a similar manner.

RLWE-based encryption scheme for integer matrices:

- We share **Setup** and **KeyGen** with those in Section 3.
- **EncryptInt(params, m, sk)**: Sample a random polynomial $a \leftarrow R'_q$ and noise $e \leftarrow \chi_{\text{err}}$. Output the ciphertext $(b = -a \cdot s + m + t \cdot e, a)$ for a message modulus t .
- **DecryptInt(params, ct, sk)**: Output $\langle \text{ct}, \text{sk} \rangle = \left[[b + a \cdot s]_q \right]_t$.
- **EncodeInt(params, T)**: Output $\sigma_{\text{int}}^{-1}(T)$, where $T \in \mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_t)^{2\varphi(p)}$.
- **DecodeInt(params, m)**: Output $\sigma_{\text{int}}(m)$.

Modulus Switching Modulus switching is a crucial maintenance operation in the BGV scheme, which reduces the ciphertext modulus q to a smaller q' to control noise growth, typically with $q' \mid q$. We refer to [HS20] for details of modulus switching and noise analysis.

- **ModSwitch(params, ct, q, q')**: For $\text{ct} = (b, a)$ satisfying $b + a \cdot s = m + t \cdot e \pmod{q}$, output $\text{ct}' = (b', a') \in R'_{q'}$ such that $b' + a' \cdot s = m + t \cdot e' \pmod{q'}$ for noise e' . Here, $\|e'\| \leq \frac{q'}{q} \|e\| + B_r$, where B_r is the rounding noise bound.

Key Switching We reuse the definitions of $\text{Switch}_{\text{small}}$ and $\text{Switch}_{\text{big}}$ from Section 3 for key switching, with slight modifications to the switching key and rescaling process. Recall that we define the RLWE' key for secret key s' as

$$\text{RLWE}'_s(s') = (\text{ct}(g_0 \cdot s'), \text{ct}(g_1 \cdot s'), \dots, \text{ct}(g_{d_g-1} \cdot s')) .$$

For integer encryption, each component of $\text{ct}(g_i \cdot s')$ satisfies

$$\langle \text{ct}(g_i \cdot s'), (1, s) \rangle = g_i \cdot s' + t \cdot e_i \bmod qq_o$$

for some noise e_i , and we use $\text{ksk}_{s' \mapsto s} = \text{RLWE}'_s(s') \in R_{qq_o}^{2d_g}$ (or $R_{qq_o}'^{2d_g}$) as the switching key. Moreover, in $\text{SwitchInt}(a, \text{ksk}_{s' \mapsto s})$, instead of simply dividing $a \odot \text{ksk}_{s' \mapsto s}$ by q_o , we use the ModSwitch operation:

$$\text{SwitchInt}(a, \text{ksk}_{s' \mapsto s}) = \text{ModSwitch}(a \odot \text{ksk}_{s' \mapsto s}, qq_o, q).$$

Then we define $\text{SwitchInt}_{\text{big}}$ and $\text{SwitchInt}_{\text{small}}$ as in Section 3.

4.3 Encrypted Integer Matrix Multiplication

The encoded matrix multiplication defined in Section 3 can be directly applied to the integer-matrix setting. Two ciphertexts are given, $\text{ct}(u) = (b_u, a_u)$ and $\text{ct}(v) = (b_v, a_v)$ in $R_q'^2$, satisfying:

$$b_u + a_u \cdot s = u + t \cdot e_u \bmod q \quad \text{and} \quad b_v + a_v \cdot s = v + t \cdot e_v \bmod q,$$

where u and v are the encodings of two sets of integer matrices $\{U^{(\ell, \pm)}\}$ and $\{V^{(\ell, \pm)}\}$ in $\{\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_t)\}^{2\varphi(p)}$. We use the same homomorphic matrix multiplication as in Section 3:

$$\text{ct}(u) \otimes \text{ct}(v) = (b_u \otimes b_v, b_u \otimes a_v, a_u \otimes b_v, a_u \otimes a_v) \in R_q'^4,$$

whose decryption is

$$\begin{aligned} & \langle \text{ct}(u) \otimes \text{ct}(v), (1, s(I, X, W), s(-I, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}), s(X, W) s(-I, Y^{-1}, W^{-1})) \rangle \\ &= (u + t \cdot e_u) \otimes (v + t \cdot e_v) = u \otimes v + t \cdot (u \otimes e_v + e_u \otimes v + t \cdot e_u \otimes e_v). \end{aligned}$$

We can see the correctness of the matrix multiplication as follows:

$$u \otimes v + t \cdot (u \otimes e_v + e_u \otimes v + t \cdot e_u \otimes e_v) \equiv u \otimes v \bmod t.$$

The increased noise is reduced by modulus switching, so their growth can be controlled to be linear. Theorem 4.1 shows that the output ciphertext encrypts the matrix multiplication of the inputs.

Theorem 4.1 (Integer matrix multiplication). *Let u and v be polynomials in R'_t encoding two sets of integer matrices $\{U^{(\ell, \pm)}\}$ and $\{V^{(\ell, \pm)}\}$ in $\{\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_t)\}^{2\varphi(p)}$ using the encoding in Eq. (5), respectively. Then, $u \otimes v$ is the encoding of the set of matrices $\{n^{-1} \cdot P^{(\ell, \pm)}\}$ in $\{\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_t)\}^{2\varphi(p)}$, where*

$$P^{(\ell, +)} = U^{(\ell, +)} V^{(\ell, -)T} \quad \text{and} \quad P^{(\ell, -)} = U^{(\ell, -)} V^{(\ell, +)T},$$

for $\ell = 0, \dots, \varphi(p) - 1$.

Proof. First, define

$$p'(I, X, Y, W) = \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} u(I, X, \zeta_\nu, W) \cdot v(-I, Y^{-1}, \zeta_\nu^{-1}, W^{-1}). \quad (6)$$

Substituting I, X, Y , and W with $\mathcal{I}, \zeta_j, \zeta_k$, and η_ℓ , respectively, yields

$$\begin{aligned} p'(\mathcal{I}, \zeta_j, \zeta_k, \eta_\ell) &= \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} u(\mathcal{I}, \zeta_j, \zeta_\nu, \eta_\ell) \cdot v(-\mathcal{I}, \zeta_k^{-1}, \zeta_\nu^{-1}, \eta_\ell^{-1}) \\ &= \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} U_{j\nu}^{(\ell,+)} V_{k\nu}^{(\ell,-)} = \left[U^{(\ell,+)} V^{(\ell,-)T} \right]_{jk}. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly,

$$p'(-\mathcal{I}, \zeta_j^{-1}, \zeta_k^{-1}, \eta_\ell^{-1}) = \left[U^{(\ell,-)} V^{(\ell,+)} \right]_{jk}^T.$$

Therefore, p' is the encoding of $U^{(\ell,+)} V^{(\ell,-)T}$ and $U^{(\ell,-)} V^{(\ell,+)}^T$.

Now, let $u = \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} u_y(I, X, W) \cdot Y^y$ and $v = \sum_{y=0}^{n-1} v_y(I, X, W) \cdot Y^y$. Rewriting Eq. (6), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} p'(I, X, Y, W) &= \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} u(I, X, \zeta_\nu, W) \cdot v(-I, Y^{-1}, \zeta_\nu^{-1}, W^{-1}) \\ &= \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} u_j(I, X, W) \zeta_\nu^j \cdot \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} v_k(-I, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \zeta_\nu^{-k} \\ &= \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} \sum_{k=0}^{n-1} u_j(I, X, W) v_k(-I, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) \sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} \zeta_\nu^{j-k}. \end{aligned}$$

By Theorem 3.3, we have

$$\sum_{\nu=0}^{n-1} \zeta_\nu^{j-k} = \begin{cases} n, & \text{if } j = k, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Hence,

$$p'(I, X, Y, W) = n \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} u_j(I, X, W) \cdot v_j(-I, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}).$$

By definition, we have

$$u \circledast v = \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} u_j(I, X, W) \cdot v_j(-I, Y^{-1}, W^{-1}) = n^{-1} p'. \quad \square$$

4.4 Other Homomorphic Operations

The addition, Hadamard product, intra-matrix rotations, inter-matrix rotations along the W -axis, and transposition are defined in the same way as in Section 3. The only difference is that we use `SwitchIntbig` and `SwitchIntsmall` for key switching. However, the automorphism $(I, X, Y, W) \mapsto (I^{-1}, X^{-1}, Y^{-1}, W^{-1})$ now corresponds to a swap between $M^{(\ell,+)}$ and $M^{(\ell,-)}$.

5 Implementation Results

5.1 Optimization: Faster Matrix Multiplication in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_q[i])$

The encrypted matrix multiplication in this work is based on matrix multiplication in the Gaussian integers modulo q . In practice, we choose a modulus q such that $\Phi_{4n}(X)$ and $\Phi_p(W)$ are

Table 1: Parameter set used for experiments. This parameter set satisfies 128-bit security as $2n\varphi(p) = 8192$ and $qq_o \approx 2^{200} < 2^{214}$ following to Boussuat et al. [BCC⁺24].

Key dist.	σ	n	p	Δ	#CRT chains	$\log q$	$\log q_o$
Ternary	3.2	256	17	40	3	140	60

Table 2: Execution times for various homomorphic operations on matrices. Each number is the average of 20 executions. The total runtime is the sum of key switching and other operations, such as NTT and multiplication. The last column shows the time solely for the matrix multiplication.

Operations		Runtime (s)			
Category	Operation	Total	Key switching	Others	Mat. Mult. in $\mathbb{Z}_q$
Matrix Mult.	Ct-Ct matrix mult. (with FLINT)	11.582 (7.237)	3.343 (3.317)	8.240 (3.920)	7.407 (3.042)
	Ct-Pt Matrix Mult. (with FLINT)	4.220 (2.064)	- -	4.220 (2.064)	3.705 (1.524)
Add/Mult.	Addition	0.018	-	0.018	-
	Hadamard Mult.	2.779	1.169	1.610	-
Transposition	Conjugation	1.216	1.178	0.038	-
	Transpose	1.712	1.674	0.038	-
	Conj. Trans.	1.758	1.682	0.039	-
Rotation	Row Rot.	1.059	1.082	0.023	-
	Column Rot.	0.005	-	0.005	-
	Inter-Matrix Rot.	1.115	1.093	0.022	-

completely decomposable over $\mathbb{Z}_q$, which ensures that the NTT can be defined on R_q . Therefore the square root of -1 , $\mathcal{I} = \sqrt{-1}$ exists in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.¹

Consider the map²

$$\begin{aligned}
(\mathbb{Z}_q[i], +, \cdot) &\rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}_q^2, +, \cdot), \\
(a + bi) &\mapsto (a + b\mathcal{I}, a - b\mathcal{I}), \quad a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q,
\end{aligned}$$

where addition and multiplication in $\mathbb{Z}_q^2$ are componentwise. The inverse map is

$$(u, v) \mapsto 2^{-1}(u + v) + 2^{-1}\mathcal{I}^{-1}(u - v)i, \quad u, v \in \mathbb{Z}_q.$$

Consequently, a matrix multiplication in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_q[i])$ is reduced to two matrix multiplications in $\mathcal{M}_n(\mathbb{Z}_q)$ using this isomorphism, where the transformation cost is minimal as it only involves addition and constant multiplication. This is relatively efficient, considering that a naive multiplication in $\mathbb{Z}_q[i]$ requires four multiplications in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

5.2 Implementation and Performance

The performance is measured on a machine equipped with an Intel i9-11900K CPU (single-threaded), 64GB RAM, running Ubuntu 22.04 LTS. The parameter set used in the experiments is shown in Table 1, and the runtime results are reported in Table 2. The parameter set corresponds to the 128-bit security level and the matrix multiplication of 16 matrices in $\mathcal{M}_{256}(\mathbb{C})$.

¹This also holds when we choose $q = \prod_i q_i$ for coprime q_i , which provides a performance gain from the residue number system (RNS) representation.

²Here, we distinguish between $\mathcal{I}$ and i : $\mathcal{I}$ denotes an element of $\mathbb{Z}_q$ satisfying $\mathcal{I}^2 = -1$, while i is used to represent the formal imaginary unit in the polynomial ring.

Table 3: Comparison of amortized key-switching runtimes. The last row reports the execution time for CKKS slot rotation in a power-of-two ring with the same modulus in the reference implementation (OpenFHE [BAB⁺22], v1.4.0). Since we use a prime $p = 17$, the W -axis NTT is performed using Rader’s FFT algorithm [Rad68]. Consequently, it is slightly slower than the power-of-two case.

	runtime (s)	slot count	amortized (μ s)
Key switching single ct for R_q	0.004697	256×16	1.147
Switch _{small} (Hadamard mult.)	1.169	$256 \times 256 \times 16$	1.115
Switch _{big} (conj. trans.)	1.682	$256 \times 256 \times 16$	1.604
two Switch _{big} (ct-ct mult.)	3.317	$256 \times 256 \times 16$	3.163
OpenFHE rotate ($\mathbb{Z}_q[X]/\langle X^{8192} + 1 \rangle$)	0.003367	4096	0.822

It can be observed from Table 2 that the runtime for matrix multiplication in $\mathcal{M}_{256}(\mathbb{Z}_q)$ dominates the total runtime of ct-ct matrix multiplication. Two versions of matrix multiplication are presented in the table: one is a custom implementation of the naive $O(n^3)$ algorithm, equipped with Montgomery reduction, and the other uses the FLINT library [FLI25]. The proposed encrypted scheme benefits from the efficiency of well-optimized matrix multiplication libraries, such as the FLINT library.

This also highlights the efficiency of the proposed scheme: although the FLINT library is already highly optimized, matrix multiplication remains the major factor. For larger matrices, the efficiency of the proposed scheme becomes more pronounced, since the asymptotic complexity of matrix multiplication is greater than that of key switching; with optimized algorithms, e.g., Coppersmith-Winograd [CW90], the time complexity of $\varphi(p)$ independent $n \times n$ matrix multiplications is $O(p \cdot n^{2.375})$, whereas for fixed d_g , the key-switching complexity is proportional to the NTT, whose time complexity is $O(p \cdot n^2 \log(np))$.

Rough Estimation of Amortized Key-Switching Overhead Although the exact cost depends on the implementation, we nevertheless provide a rough estimation of the amortized key-switching overhead, as it offers useful insight into the scheme and its performance. Table 3 summarizes the runtime of key switching for a single ciphertext in R_q , compared to results from Table 2; we can see that the key switching cost for matrix multiplication is 2.76 and 3.84 times that of key switching in R_q and power-of-two ring of ordinary HE, respectively.

The key-switching cost is usually dominated by the NTT/INTT. Conventional RLWE-based schemes defined over $\mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle \Phi_m(X) \rangle$ require an NTT over $\varphi(m)$ coefficients, where the slot count is $\varphi(m)/2$. Our proposed scheme is defined over $R \cong \mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle \Phi_{4np}(X) \rangle$; the NTT for **Switch**_{big} requires an NTT over $2n^2\varphi(p)$ coefficients, while the total slot count is $n^2\varphi(p)$.

The Cooley–Tukey algorithm requires $\frac{N}{2}(\log N - 1)$ multiplications for an NTT over N coefficients. Therefore, the amortized NTT cost for **Switch**_{big} is approximately $2 \log n + \log \varphi(p)$, while the amortized NTT cost for **Switch**_{small} is approximately $\log n + \log \varphi(p)$, so the ratio is roughly³

$$\frac{2 \log n + \log \varphi(p)}{\log n + \log \varphi(p)} \leq 2.$$

Note that this cost for **Switch**_{small} is essentially the same as that of conventional HE schemes, since it involves independent n key switching without any additional Y -direction operations. Since matrix multiplication requires two key switches, the amortized key-switching overhead for matrix multiplication is at most four times that of Hadamard multiplication in conventional RLWE-based schemes.

³In practice, the W -axis NTT requires more operation as p is not a power of two.

6 Conclusion

We proposed an FHE scheme for efficient matrix arithmetic, supporting ct/pt-ct matrix multiplication, addition, Hadamard multiplication, transposition, and both intra- and inter-matrix rotations. The key idea of our construction lies in combining a multivariate ring structure with a Gaussian-integer perspective, which enables a natural and efficient encoding of matrices of various sizes into RLWE ciphertexts. By introducing the homomorphic trace operation, we showed that encrypted matrix multiplication can be reduced to four standard matrix multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_q[i]$, or equivalently eight matrix multiplications over $\mathbb{Z}_q$, for ciphertext modulus q , without relying on expensive operations such as slot-to-coefficient conversion or ring switching.

We demonstrated that the proposed scheme generalizes seamlessly from complex to integer matrices via a BGV-like encoding. Moreover, the scheme is directly compatible with existing bootstrapping algorithms, allowing it to serve as a practical building block for deep circuits. Our implementation using the FLINT library confirms that matrix multiplication remains the major cost, despite requiring only four times more matrix multiplications in $\mathbb{Z}_q[i]$ to realize a matrix multiplication over $\mathbb{C}$. The key switching for matrix multiplication is also well optimized, as its amortized overhead is bounded by about four times that of Hadamard multiplication in conventional HE schemes. Together, these results indicate that our construction achieves substantial overall efficiency.

Future directions include integrating more advanced matrix arithmetic, such as matrix inversion and decomposition, extending the framework, and exploring hardware acceleration through GPUs or specialized FHE processors, as our scheme benefits from fast plaintext matrix multiplication. We believe that the proposed scheme opens a new pathway for applying HE to machine learning and data analysis tasks where secure matrix operations are the central primitive.

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